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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to a 
transfer of the case by the Utah Supreme Court on April 11,1988, pursuant 
to Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
The lower court entered judgment against all defendants for the 
architectural services rendered by Vernon E. Bush. It found that the 
Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard C. Bennion had a 10% interest in a 
joint venture with Process Instruments & Control, Inc and John Hall, but 
were responsible for I/2 of the judgment for the bill owed Vernon C. Bush. 
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From this judgment establishing Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard C. 
Bennion liable for 1/2 of the judgment, this appeal was taken. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was there any evidence to establish Richard C. Bennion as being 
personally liable for the architectural services rendered by Vernon E. 
Bush? 
2. Did the judgment entered against Commerce Properties, Inc. 
violate the provisions of Sec. 70A-2-201, and 25-5-4(2), U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended? 
3. Did the judgment entered against Commerce Properties, Inc. for 
50% of the Vernon E. Bush bill conform to the findings showing that 
Commerce Properties, Inc. only had a 10% interest in the venture? 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
"70A-2-201. Formal requirements-Statute of Frauds 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the 
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable 
by way of action or defense unless there is some writing 
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made 
between the parties and signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A 
writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly 
states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable 
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in 
such writing. 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of 
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is 
enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the 
buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the 
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ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller, 
before notice of repudiation is received and under 
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods 
are for the buyer, has made either a substantial 
beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their 
procurement; or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits 
in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a 
contract for sale was made, but the contract is not 
enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of 
goods admitted; or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made 
and accepted or which have been received and accepted 
(section 70a-2-206) 
"25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and 
subscr ibed. In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed 
within one year from the making thereof. 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another. 
"Rule 52. Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall 
be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. 
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
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be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It 
will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the 
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by 
the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of 
the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 
50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
"48-1-15. Rules determining rights and duties of 
partners. The rights and duties of the partners in relation to 
the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement 
between them, by the following rules: 
(1) Each partner.... must contribute towards the losses, 
whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership 
according to his share in the profits." 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
This was an action to collect fees for architectural services rendered 
by Vernon E. Bush for a custom designed building for Process Instruments 
& Control, Inc. (the PIC Building). Vernon E. Bush also brought this action 
against Commerce Properties, Inc. which acted as the real estate broker 
and project manager for Process Instruments & Control, Inc. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following are the facts deemed most favorable to respondents on 
appeal. Respondent Bush performed customized architectural services and 
provided $13,000.00 in plans and designs for a building to be constructed 
for and purchased by Respondent Process Instruments & Control and John 
Hall.(Findings 3 and 6, R. 49, 50) Appellant Commerce Properties acted 
as the project manager for Process Instruments & Control (PIC) and John 
Hall to assist them in arranging for the purchase of the land, financing, 
and construction of the PIC building. For its services, Commerce 
Properties was to receive a 10% commission if the project proceeded. 
(Finding 3, R. 49) Based on this commission arrangement, the lower court 
found that Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard C. Bennion were 
co-venturers with PIC and John Hall. (Finding 3, R. 49) 
PIC and John Hall paid for all costs incurred except Vernon E. Bush's, 
including the appraisals, additional construction drawings made by Felt 
Construction based on Bush's architectural drawings, the bank origination 
loan fees, financing services, etc.(TR.126-127). PIC and John Hall 
subsequently abandoned the project after the loan was approved, and 
elected to lease other space, according to the testimony of John Hall: 
"Q. Now, in December you received a commitment from 
Zions Bank for half of the funding; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. After reading the document today, 
yes. 
Q. All right. So Mr. Bennion wasn't holding up the project 
to build the building for you at that time; it was pending your 
financing application; isn't that correct? 
A. That's exactly what the Earnest Money stated. 
Q. All right. And Mr. Bennion was not in a position to 
abandon the SBA application, was he? 
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A. I don't believe so. 
Q. So basically it was your decision to abandon the SBA 
application; isn't that correct? 
A. Yes it was." (TR.125) 
Q. And you abandoned the SBA financing approximately 
when? 
A. I believe the early part of '86. (TR 128-129) 
Q. So you got in a new space without having to advance 
significant fees? 
A. That is correct. (TR. 129) 
After abandoning the project, PIC and John Hall did not pay Commerce 
Properties, Inc. (TR. 137) or Vernon E. Bush for their services.(TR.127). 
From the judgment entered by the trial court determining that Commerce 
Properties, Inc. and Richard C. Bennion was only a 10% joint venture 
partner, but responsible for one half of Mr. Bush's architectural services 
bill (Judgment, R. 45), this appeal was taken. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
a. There was no evidence presented at trial establishing Richard C. 
Bennion at any time acted in an individual capacity, and therefore the 
personal judgment entered against him was in error. 
b. The judgment entered against Commerce Properties, Inc. violated 
the provisions of Sec. 70A-2-201, and 25-5-4(2), U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended. There was no writing entered in evidence where Commerce 
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Properties, Inc. signed an agreement with Vernon E. Bush to answer for 
the obligations of PIC and John Hall for whom the engineered plans and 
drawings worth in excess of $500.00 were made. Without a writing, the 
provider, Vernon E. Bush, may only recover against PIC and John Hall who 
received the benefits conferred from his customized engineering building 
plans. 
c. The conclusions of law that Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard 
C. Bennion are responsible for 1/2 of Vernon E. Bush's bill conflict with 
the findings of fact establishing Commerce Properties, Inc. as only a 10% 
joint venture partner with PIC and John Hall. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
RICHARD C. BENNION WAS NOT ACTING IN AN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY 
Under Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in all actions tried 
upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law thereon. These findings of fact 
must be based on oral or documentary evidence. Rule 52 states: 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
"(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury 
the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous 
There was no evidence presented at trial establishing Richard C. 
Bennion at any time acted in an individual capacity, and therefore the 
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personal judgment entered against him was in error. Commerce 
Properties, Inc. is a 35 member real estate brokerage firm incorporated 
and licensed to do business in the State of Utah. All the documentary 
evidence indicated that Commerce Properties, Inc. was retained as project 
manager, and was to receive a 10% contingent commission if the PIC 
Building was constructed. Nor was there any oral evidence given which 
established that Richard C. Bennion was the alter ego of Commerce 
Properties, Inc., or that he was acting in an individual capacity. The 
findings and judgment against Richard C. Bennion, individually, were 
therefore entered without any support on the record, and should be set 
aside as being clearly erroneous; see Harker vs. Condominiums Forest Glen, 
Inc., 740 P.2d 1361 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
POINT TWO 
THERE WAS NO WRITING SIGNED BY COMMERCE PROPERTIES. INC. 
ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR VERNON E. BUSH'S DRAWINGS 
Under Sec. 70A-2-201, U.C. A., 1953, as amended, except as otherwise 
provided in this section, a contract for the sale of goods for the price of 
$500.00 or more (the $13,000.00 Bush drawings, engineering studies, and 
specifications for the PIC Building) is not enforceable by way of action or 
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract 
for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against 
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. Sec. 
70A-2-201, U.C.A., I953, as amended, states: 
70A-2-201. Formal Requirements-Statute of Frauds 
(1) "Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract 
for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not 
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enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is 
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for 
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the 
party against whom enforcement is sought or by his 
authorized agent or broker.... 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of 
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is 
enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the 
buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the 
ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller, 
before notice of repudiation is received and under 
circumstances which reasonably indicated that the goods 
are for the buyer, has made either a substantial 
beginning of their manufacture of commitments for their 
procurement; or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court 
that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is 
not enforceable under the provision beyond the quantity 
of goods admitted; or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been 
made and accepted or which have been received and 
accepted (section 70a-2-606)." 
The record is devoid of any writings signed by Commerce Properties, 
Inc. where it agreed to pay Vernon E. Bush for the drawings. Therefore, 
liability for payment of the same, must lie under the exceptions outlined 
in Sec. 70A-2-201 (3). These exceptions outlined in Sec. 70A-2-201 (3)(1) 
are: (a) production of custom designed goods for the benefit of the party 
to be bound , (b) admissions in the pleadings or on the record that a 
contract for sale was made, and (c) receipt and acceptance of the goods by 
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the party to be bound. There were no admissions in the pleadings or on the 
record that Commerce Properties agreed to pay for the Bush drawings; 
therefore any liability to be imposed against Commerce Properties, 
Inc.would have to be imposed under subsections 70A-2-201(a) or (c). 
It was uncontroverted that the Bush drawings were custom designed 
for the construction of the PIC building to meet the Process Instruments & 
Control, Inc.'s operating requirements. Mr. Hall personally provided rough 
drawings to Mr. Bush of the floor plan meeting his needs (Exhibit P-2). Mr. 
Bush testified he met several times with Mr. Hall who provided 
handwritten changes to the drawings (Exhibit P-3F): 
"A. There were a number of occasions when in the 
process of developing the preliminaries, I dropped off plans at 
Mr. Hall's office and-
Q. When you dropped off the plans to his office, did you 
see him personally? 
A. On one occasion, I did. Most of the time I gave them 
to his receptionist. 
Q. Before we get to that meeting, I wanted to draw your 
attention to the exhibits in this packet that were marked up by 
Mr. Hall. If you would, would you go through and indicate which 
of those exhibits bear Mr. Hall's handwriting? 
A. P-3F." 
(TR.31,32) 
Mr. Bush and his structural engineer Fred Fife testified that this 
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custom floor plan design required a unique pillar spacing for the PIC 
building, which resulted in higher engineering costs than would normally 
be anticipated for a standard building design. Mr. Fife explained the reason 
for these higher costs as follows: 
"Q. What is the difference between the PIC building and 
some of the other buildings that you have been designing in the 
6,000 square foot range that justified the additional work? 
A. Well, the PIC building was rather unique. In fact 
every building is unique, but this one had particularly unusual 
column spacings and generally unique foyers that caused a need 
for extra attention to the design process. 
Q. What would a conventional building be in the range of 
in the 6,000 square foot range for doing your typical review? 
A. A review? Or do you mean design? 
Q. Same type of work you did for PIC. 
A. Well, might be I would guess maybe half as much time 
to design a 6,000 square foot warehouse building. 
Q. So this was not--this was more of a customized type 
of project than you were normally used to seeing? 
A. Yes, it was." 
(TR 147-148). 
The drawings were custom designed for Process Instruments & 
Control, Inc. and its owner, John Hall's, needs-not Commerce Properties, 
Inc.'s. Therefore, liability against Commerce Properties, Inc. under 
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subsection (a) will not lie. 
Under subsection (c), receipt and acceptance of the custom designed 
goods was directly made by Process Instruments & Control, Inc. The Bush 
PIC drawings were forwarded to Process Instruments & Control, Inc. and 
used to apply for the loan to construct the PIC building (Exhibit D-13). 
Therefore, liability against Commerce Properties, Inc. under subsection (c) 
will not lie. 
Nor was there any writing where Commerce Properties, Inc. agreed to 
answer to the Bush debt incurred by Process Instruments & Control, Inc. as 
required under Sec. 25-5-4(2),U.C.A., 1953, as amended. Sec. 25-5-4(2), 
U.C.A., 1953, as amended provides: 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written 
and subscribed. "In the following cases every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the part to by 
charged therewith: 
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another. 
Recovery against Commerce Properties, Inc. can therefore only be had 
under a quantum meruit or theory of unjust enrichment; see Baugh vs. Darly 
(1947) 112 U. 1,184 P.2d 335. As Process Instruments & Control, Inc. 
directly received the benefit of the Bush custom designed PIC Building 
drawings, and used the same for their building loan application, Process 
Instruments & Control, Inc. should pay for the value of the drawings 
received; especially where it arbitrarily elected to drop the loan 
application after the same was approved. Commerce Properties, Inc. could 
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not use these special purpose drawings for any other development. Nor did 
it receive any benefit from these plans. 
In summary, the judgment entered against Commerce Properties, Inc. 
violated the provisions of Sec. 70A-2-201, and 25-5-4(2), U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended. There was no writing entered in evidence where Commerce 
Properties, Inc. signed an agreement with Vernon E. Bush to answer for the 
obligations of PIC and John Hall for whom the plans worth in excess of 
$500.00 were drawn. Without a writing, the provider Vernon E. Bush may 
only recover against Process Instruments & Control and John Hall who 
received the benefits conferred by the customized engineering PIC 
building plans; see Fabian vs. Wasatch Orchard Co. (1912), 41 U. 404,125 
P. 860 LRA 1916D, 892, distinguished in 56 U. 243,188 P. 640. 
POINT THREE 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT COMMERCE PROPERTIES WAS A 
50/50 JOINT VENTURE PARTNER CONFLICT WITH THE FINDINGS AND 
ARE THEREFORE WRONG AS A MATTER OF LAW 
If Commerce Properties, Inc. is liable for payment of Vernon E. Bush's 
services, it is only responsible for 10% of the bill, not 50%. Under 
Paragraph 3 of the Findings of Fact, Commerce Properties, Inc. and 
Richard C. Bennion had a 10% contingent interest in the joint venture. 
Paragraph 3 of the Findings of Fact states: 
"3. The evidence shows that all of the defendants were 
engaged in a joint venture with the intent of purchasing the 
real property described in the Earnest Money Agreement, 
constructing a building thereon for the use and benefit of the 
defendants. Process Instruments & Control. Inc. and John A. 
Hall, from which transaction the defendants. Commerce 
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Properties. Inc. and Richard C. Bennion. were to receive ten 
percent (10%^ of the total cost of said venture." 
The lower court specifically found that the building was to be 
constructed for Process Instruments & Control, Inc. and its owner John A. 
Hall. It further found that Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard C. 
Bennion were only to receive ten percent (10%) of the total cost of said 
venture. Therefore, under Sec. 48-1-15(1), Utah Code Annotated, I953, as 
amended, if these defendants were only liable for Vernon E. Bush bill, they 
were only liable for 10% of it. Sec. 48-1-15(1), Utah Code Annotated, I953, 
as amended, states: 
48-1-15. Rules determining rights and duties of 
partners. The rights and duties of the partners in relation to 
the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement 
between them, by the following rules: 
(1) Each partner.... must contribute towards the losses, 
whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership 
according to his share in the profits. 
The conclusions of law are therefore in error that appellants were 
responsible for I/2 of the bill for Vernon E. Bush's architectural services, 
and should be set aside or modified to reflect their ten percent (10%) 
interest in the joint venture found by the lower court; see Western Kane 
County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 vs. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 
1987). Alternatively, if appellants are responsible for one half of the bill 
for architectural services, they are entitled to seek contribution and 
reimbursement from defendants Process Instruments & Control, Inc. and 
John A. Hall for 90% of any amounts appellants have to pay in accordance 
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with the percentages of the partnership. 
CONCLUSION 
The personal judgment against Richard C. Bennion should be set aside 
as there was no evidence that he acted in an individual capacity to be 
personally responsible for the Bush architectural services. Nor was there 
any writing upon which Commerce Properties, Inc. can be held responsible 
for the customized PIC drawings, and engineering prepared for John A. 
Hall, and Process Instruments & Control, Inc. In the event liability for the 
architectural drawings and engineering services is imposed against 
appellants under the facts of this case, liability should be reduced and 
apportioned to reflect appellants' contingent 10% interest in the venture. 
Alternatively, appellants should be entitled to judgment against 
defendants and respondents Hall and PIC for 90% reimbursement of any 
amounts they are required to pay. 
Dated this 21 st day of July, I988. 
Marcus G. Theodore 
Attorney for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
RULES AND STATUTES 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 25-5-4 
rejected written offer. Mendelson v. Roland 
(1926) 66 U 487,243 P 798. 
Surrender, release or discharge. 
Surrender of interest under contract for 
purchase of land could be properly effected 
without deed or conveyance in writing in 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2467; L. 
1909, ch. 72, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 5817; R.S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 33-5-4. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws 
1876, §1014; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §§2835, 
3918, 4219. 
Affirmative defense. 
When action is on contract, admitted by 
defendant, he must interpose special plea of 
statute if statute is to be available as 
defense. Abba v. Smyth (1899) 21 U 109, 59 
P756. 
Statute of frauds must be pleaded by party 
relying upon it as a defense. M & S Constr. 
& Engineering Co. v. Clearfield State Bank 
(1967) 19 U 2d 86, 426 P 2d 227. 
Defendant, who answered by a general 
denial and simultaneous motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs claim as being barred under 
subsec. (2) of this section, proceeded improp-
erly, since under Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, statute of frauds is not a 
ground for motion to dismiss but rather an 
affirmative defense under Rule 8(c). W. W. & 
W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas (1970) 24 U 2d 
264,470 P 2d 252. 
compliance with statute. Budge v. Barron 
(1917) 51 U 234,169 P 745. 
Collateral References. 
Frauds, Statute of <£» 71 et seq. 
37 CJS Frauds, Statute of § 90 et seq. 
72 AmJur 2d 616 et seq., Statute of Frauds 
§ 59 et seq. 
Alteration or modification of original con-
tract. 
If original contract, to be binding and 
enforceable, and to satisfy the statute of 
frauds, is required to be in writing and sub-
scribed by parties sought to be charged, then 
a subsequent agreement altering or modify-
ing any of its material parts or terms is also 
required to be in writing and so subscribed, 
no part performance or anything done by 
such party in reliance on the subsequent 
agreement being alleged or proved, especially 
if interest in land is involved. Combined Met-
als, Inc. v. Bastian (1928) 71 U 535, 267 P 
1020, distinguished in 100 U 516, 116 P 2d 
578. 
Parties may modify orally an agreement in 
writing where the original contract is not 
required by statute of frauds to be in writing, 
at least where there is consideration for such 
modification. But a contract required by stat-
ute of frauds to be in writing cannot be mod-
ified by a subsequent oral agreement, 
although this rule is subject to many excep-
tions, the first great division coming between 
executory and executed modifications. 
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc. 
(1935) 88 U 194, 48 P 2d 489, affirmed on 
rehearing 88 U 213, 53 P 2d 1153. 
An oral modification of a contract required 
to be in writing, when such modification is 
fully executed, is taken out of the statute. In 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. In 
the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, 
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within 
one year from the making thereof. 
$\ Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of 
aifSther. 
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration 
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry. 
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to 
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator 
or intestate out of his own estate. 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for compensation. 
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In absence of agreement or proof of agree- option or executory contract for the property, 
ment to contrary, partners will divide profits 152 ALR1001. 
and losses equally. Kimball v. McCornick Liability of partner for failure to perform 
(1927) 70 U 189,259 P 313. personal services, 165 ALR 981. 
Meaning and coverage of "book value" in 
Collateral References. partnership agreement in determining value 
Partnership <S=> 70. o f partner's interest, 47 ALR 2d 1425. 
68 CJS Partnership § 76 Partner's breach of fiduciary duty to 
60 AmJur 2d 35 to 42, Partnership H108 "partner on sale of PartnersMp interest to 
tollc another partner, 4 ALR 4th 1122. 
. . . . . -
 t. Powers, duties, and accounting responsibil-
Accountabihty of partners for profits ities of man aging partner of mining partner-
earned subsequent to death or dissolution, 80
 Bhip, 24 ALR 2d 1359. 
ALR 12, 55 ALR 2d 1391. Provision of partnership agreement giving 
Actions at law between partners and part- one partner option to buy out the other, 160 
nerships, 58 ALR 621,168 ALR 1088. ALR 523. 
Construction and application of section 18 Relative rights of surviving partner and 
(f) of Uniform Partnership Act as to surviv- the estate of the deceased partner in pro-
ing partner's right to compensation for ser- ceeds of life insurance acquired pursuant to 
vices in winding up partnership, 81 ALR 2d partnership agreement, 83 ALR 2d 1347. 
445. Right of partner or member of joint adven-
Duty of former partner, acquiring property ture to share in misappropriated money or 
occupied by partnership business, to renew property, or secret profits for which he is 
lease, 40 ALR 2d 102. required to account, 118 ALR 640. 
Duty of one who joins with others as part- Right of partners inter se in respect of 
ners or members of a joint adventure in the interest, 66 ALR 3. 
purchase of property from a third person to Salaries of partners, contract as to, 66 
share with them the benefit of an existing ALR 2d 1023. 
48-1-16. Partnership books. The partnership books shall be kept, sub-
ject to any agreement between the partners, at the principal place of busi-
ness of the partnership, and every partner shall at all times have access 
to and may inspect and copy any of them. 
History L. 1921, ch. 89, § 19; R.S. 1933 & Collateral References. 
C. 1943,69-1-16. Partnership <S=> 80. 
68 CJS Partnership § 91. 
60 AmJur 2d 167, Partnership § 264. 
48-1-17. Duty of partners to render information. Partners shall 
render on demand true and full information of all things affecting the 
partnership to any partner, or the legal representatives of any deceased 
partner, or partner under legal disability. 
Hiatory: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 20; R.S. 1933 & 60 AmJur 2d 35, 47, Partnership §§ 108, 
C. 1943,69-1-17. 123. 
Collateral References. Partner's breach of fiduciary duty to 
Partnership C=> 70. copartner on sale of partnership interest to 
68 CJS Partnership § 76. another partner, 4 ALR 4th 1122. 
48-1-18. Partner accountable as a fiduciary. Every partner must 
account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any 
profits, derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any 
transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the 
partnership or from any use by him of its property. 
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This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased partner 
engaged in the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership as the personal 
representatives of the last surviving partner. 
History: L 1921, ch. 89, § 21; R.S. 1933 <& 
C. 1943. 69-1-18. 
Breach of trust. 
Where employee of one of group of joint 
adventurers, seeking to buy and sell certain 
contiguous lands having valuable clay depos-
its, discovers clay on other adjoining land, 
obtains option thereon, and enters into a con-
tract with the group for a share of the pro-
ceeds and upon consideration of his option 
being turned over to the group, his employer 
is not chargeable with breach of trust toward 
other original adventurers for failing to 
inform them of employee's discovery until 
after he obtained option. Lane v. Peterson 
(1926) 68 U 585, 251 P 374. 
Partnership income. 
Where partnership was organized for pur-
pose of furnishing supplies to laborers 
employed by power and light company, and 
one partner was to act as treasurer and fur-
nish all foreign labor on construction work 
for which he was to receive in full payment 
thereof one-third of net profits of copartner-
ship, it was held that money received for fur-
History: L 1921, ch. 89, §22; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-19. 
Conditions precedent to accounting. 
Before one partner can compel another 
partner to pay what is claimed to be indebt-
edness to partnership, it must be first ascer-
tained that amount is necessary in settling 
partnership affairs, or that amount owing by 
such partner is greater amount than he 
would be entitled to receive upon striking 
balance and finding interest of each partner 
in assets of partnership. Bankers' Trust Co. 
v. Riter (1920) 56 U 525,190 P 1113. 
Duty to account. 
Where one partner has forcibly expelled 
the other and assumed control of and contin-
nishing labor should constitute partnership 
income. Paggi v. Skliris (1919) 54 U 88,179 P 
739. 
Relations inter se. 
The relation of partners as between them-
selves is a fiduciary one, that of trustee and 
cestui que trust, and this fiduciary relation-
ship exists between surviving partner and 
legal representative of deceased partner. 
Sharp v. Sharp (1919) 54 U 262,180 P 580. 
Secret profits. 
Member of partnership will not be permit-
ted to take advantage of any secret agree-
ment to receive private or personal gain for 
work or business carried on by partnership. 
Paggi v. Skliris (1919) 54 U 88,179 P 739. 
Collateral References. 
Partnership <$=> 81. 
68 CJS Partnership §5 76, 378. 
60 AmJur 2d 35, 49, 50, 168, Partnership 
§§ 108,124,126, 265. 
Right of partner or member of joint adven-
ture to share in misappropriated money or 
property, or secret profits, for which he is 
required to account, 118 ALR 640. 
ued to carry on the business himself, the 
partner thus working dissolution of the firm 
must account to the injured partner. 
Hannaman v. Karrick (1893) 9 U 236, 33 P 
1039, affd. 168 US 328, 42 L Ed 484, 18 S Ct 
135. 
Estates of decedents. 
Administrator of deceased partner held 
entitled to maintain an action against heirs 
of another partner for general accounting of 
partnership affairs, where it appeared that 
accounting was necessary, coupled with addi-
tional fact that estate of other partner had 
been closed and personal representative 
released from further duty in administration 
of his estate. Bankers' Trust Co. v. Riter 
(1920) 56 U 525,190 P1113. 
48-1-19. Right to an account* Any partner shall have the right to a 
formal account as to partnership affairs: 
(1) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business or pos-
session of its property by his copartners. 
(2) If the right exists under the terms of any agreement. 
(3) As provided by section 48-1-18. 
(4) Whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable. 
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timber to be cut is a contract for the sale of goods within this chap-
ter whether the subject matter is to be severed by the buyer or 
by the seller even though it forms part of the realty at the time 
of contracting, and the parties can by identification effect a present 
sale before severance. 
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any third party rights 
provided by the law relating to realty records, and the contract for 
sale may be executed and recorded as a document transferring an 
interest in land and shall then constitute notice to third parties of 
the buyer's rights under the contract for sale. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-107; 1977, ch. Cross-References. 
272, § 3. "Goods" defined, 70A-2-105, 70A-9-105 (f). 
Secured transactions, sales of accounts, 
Compiler's Notes. contract rights and chattel paper, 70A-9-101 
The 1977 amendment substituted "min- to70A-9-507. 
erals or the like (including oil or gas)" near S t a t u t e o f f r a u d s ' ™A-2-201. 
the beginning of subsec. (1) for "timber, min- Collateral References. 
erals or the like"; and inserted "or of timber Sales <&=> 10,11. 
to be cut" in the middle of subsec. (2). 77 CJS Sales §§ 13,15. 
PART 2 
FORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT OF CONTRACT 
Section 
70A-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of frauds. 
70A-2-202. Final written expression — Parol or extrinsic evidence. 
70A-2-203. Seals inoperative. 
70A-2-204. Formation in general. 
70A-2-205. Firm offers. 
70A-2-206. Offer and acceptance in formation of contract 
70A-2-207. Additional terms in acceptance or confirmation. 
70A-2-208. Course of performance or practical construction. 
70A-2-209. Modification, rescission and waiver. 
70A-2-210. Delegation of performance — Assignment of rights. 
70A-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of frauds. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale 
of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way 
of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indi-
cate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties 
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or 
by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient 
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the 
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quan-
tity of goods shown in such writing. 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confir-
mation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received 
and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satis-
fies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless 
written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days 
after it is received. 
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(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection 
(1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer 
and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course 
of the seller's business and the seller, before notice of repu-
diation is received and under circumstances which reason-
ably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made 
either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or com-
mitments for their procurement; or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in 
his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract 
for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under 
this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and 
accepted nr which have been received and accepted (section 
70a-2-60C~ 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-201. 
Cross-References. 
"Action" defined, 70A-1-201 (1). 
Additional terms in acceptance or confir-
mation, 70A-2-207. 
Bulk sales, 70A-6-101 to 70A-6-111. 
"Contract" defined, 70A-1-201 (11). 
Modification, rescission and waiver, 
70A-2-209. 
Parol or extrinsic evidence, 70A-2-202. 
Price payable in money, goods, realty, or 
otherwise, 70A-2-304. 
Statute of frauds generally, 25-5. 
Admission of contract's existence. 
Where party to a transaction between a 
merchant and a nonmerchant admitted that 
he would have considered himself bound by 
their oral agreement if he had received con-
firmation of it within a reasonable time, the 
admission did not bring into operation the 
provisions of subd. (3) (b) and validate the 
otherwise unenforceable agreement. Lish v. 
Compton (1976) 547 P 2d 223. 
"Between merchants" exception. 
Since a farmer, party to a transaction with 
a grain dealer, was not a "merchant" within 
the meaning of this section, subsec. (2) did 
not apply and the statute of frauds rendered 
unenforceable an oral agreement to sell the 
farmer's whole wheat crop, valued substan-
tially in excess of $500. Lish v. Compton 
(1976) 547 P 2d 223. 
Confirmatory memorandum. 
Where two elephant merchants agreed 
over the telephone to the sale and purchase 
of the animal "Peggy," and buyer sent seller 
a letter confirming the terms of the sale 
agreement, the statute of frauds was satis-
fied, since it did not appear that seller had 
objected to the memorandum in writing. 
Miller v. Kaye (1975) 545 P 2d 199. 
Modification of contract. 
The modification of a contract, which does 
not contain a provision under 70A-2-209 (2) 
requiring a signed writing applicable to the 
modification in question, is governed by 
subsecs. (1) and (2) of this section. Monroe, 
Inc. v. Jack B. Parson Constr. Co. (1979) 604 
P 2d 901. 
Collateral References. 
Frauds, Statute of <3= 81 et seq.; Sales <&=> 
26 to 32. 
37 CJS Frauds, Statute of § 138 et seq.; 77 
CJS Sales §§ 58 to 64. 
67 AmJur 2d 169 to 172, 213 to 217, Sales 
§§ 57 to 60, 99 to 102. 
Acceptance satisfying statute where pur-
chaser in possession at time of sale, 111 ALR 
1312. 
Admission of contract by defendant as 
affecting sufficiency of acts relied on to con-
stitute part performance under statute of 
frauds, 90 ALR 231. 
Agency to purchase personal property for 
another as within statute of frauds, 20 ALR 
2d 1140. 
Check as payment within contemplation of 
statute of frauds, 8 ALR 2d 251. 
Check or note as memorandum satisfying 
statute of frauds, 20 ALR 363,153 ALR 1112. 
Construction and application of UCC 
§2-201 (3) (b) rendering contract of sale 
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cific enough to bring to the attention of the 
court all claimed errors in the instructions and 
to give the court an opportunity to correct 
them if the court deems it proper. Employers' 
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 123 Utah 
253, 258 P.2d 445 (1953). 
——-Explanation of grounds. 
To appeal the giving or the refusal of an in-
struction, a party must properly object to the 
instructions in the trial court and explain its 
grounds, with specificity, for challenging the 
instructions. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condomin-
ium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). 
Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-
ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v Cloward, 14 Utah 
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v. 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 
(1964); Memmott v. United States Fuel Co., 22 
Utah 2d 356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v. 
Newell J. Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 
2d 270, 480 P.2d 462 '1971); Flynn v. W.P. 
Harlin Constr. Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 
356 (1973); McGinn v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. 
Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. 
Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall, 
671 P.2d 201 (Utah 1983); Highland Constr. 
Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1984); Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 
1986); Penrod v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 
1987); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 573 
et seq. 
C.J.S. — 88 CJ.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448. 
AJLR. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 
501. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
AJLR.3d 10. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
ity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 
18 A.L.R.3d 88. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.LJUd 170. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agree-
ment, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154. 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products liability case, 52 
A.L.R.3d 102. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51, and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court, 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
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to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preced-
ing win granting" in the first sentence, inserted 
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth 
sentence and added the last sentence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—Contempt. 
In presence of court. 
Written. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 






—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND JUDGMENT 
JOHN L. MCCOY (2164) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
310 S. Main Street #1309 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 355-6400 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON E. BUSH, Plaintiff, , 
vs. ] 
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., a ] 
Corporation, RICHARD C. BENNION,, 
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS & CONTROL, ] 







This matter came on for trial on the 14th day of 
December, 1987, at the hour 9:00 a.m., the plaintiff appearing 
personally and by and through his counsel of record, John L. 
McCoy, and the defendants, Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard 
C. Bennion appearing by and through their counsel of record, 
Marcus G. Theodore, and the defendants, Process Instruments & 
Control, Inc. and John A. Hall, appearing by and through their 
counsel of record, Peter M. Ennenga, and the Court having heard 
oral testimony and received documentary evidence from all parties 
as to all of the issues with respect to the claim of plaintiff 
and the crossclaims by both of the defendants, and having 
heard oral argument from the respective counsel for the parties, 
and the Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law now makes and enters the following Judgjme 
IT I S HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t t h e 
p l a i n t i f f be and he i s h e r e b y a w a r d e d a j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s , b o t h j o i n t l y a n d s e v e r a l l y , i n t h e sum o f 
$ 1 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , p l u s i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e o f t e n p e r c e n t (10%) f rom 
A p r i l 4 , 1 9 8 5 i n t h e sum of $ 3 , 5 3 7 . 8 4 f o r a t o t a l of $ 1 6 , 5 3 7 . 8 4 , 
s a i d sum t o a c c r u e i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e of 12% p e r annum u n t i l 
p a i d i n f u l l , t o g e t h e r w i t h c o s t s of C o u r t h e r e i n a s s e s s e d a t t h e 
sum of $ 6 0 0 . 4 3 . 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t 
i f e i t h e r of t h e d e f e n d a n t s pay a n y sum i n e x c e s s o f 50% of t h e 
a f o r e s a i d j u d g m e n t , t h e n t h a t d e f e n d a n t s h a l l h a v e and b e 
e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g m e n t o v e r a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t t o t h e 
e x t e n t t h a t such paymen t e x c e e d s 50% of t h e j u d g m e n t . 
j 
DATED t h i s Jt^j} d a ¥ o f December , 1 9 8 7 . 
BY THE COURT: 
( JUDgE SC0TT DANIELS 
JOHN L. MCCOY (2164) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
310 S. Main Street #1309 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 355-6400 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON E. BUSH, Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Corporation, RICHARD C. BENNION, 
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS & CONTROL, ] 
INC., and JOHN A. HALL, 
Defendants. ] 
i FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. C-87-1224 
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS 
This matter came on for trial on the 14th day of 
December, 1987, at the hour 9:00 a.m., the plaintiff appearing 
personally and by and through his counsel of record, John L. 
McCoy, and the defendants, Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard 
C. Bennion appearing personally and by and through their counsel 
of record, Marcus G. Theodore, and the defendants, Process 
Instruments & Control, Inc. and John A. Hall, appearing 
personally and by and through their counsel of record, Peter M. 
Ennenga, and the Court having heard oral testimony and received 
documentary evidence from all parties as to all of the issues 
with respect to the claim of plaintiff and the crossclaims by 
both of the defendants, and having heard oral argument from the 
•espective counsel for the parties, and being fully advised in 
.he premises, now does hereby enter its Findings of Fact and 
Conc lus ions of Law as f o l l o w s : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. P l a i n t i f f a t a l l t i m e s m a t e r i a l h e r e i n was a 
l i c e n s e d a r c h i t e c t i n the S t a t e of Utah. 
2. An E a r n e s t Money Agreement: was s i g n e d b e t w e e n t h e 
d e f e n d a n t s , R i c h a r d C. Benn ion , a s s e l l e r , and John A. H a l l , a s 
buyer , for the pu rchase of c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y t o g e t h e r wi th a 
b u i l d i n g t o be c o n s t r u c t e d t h e r e o n ; h o w e v e r , t h i s Cour t f i n d s 
t h a t s a i d document was not an i n t e g r a t i o n of a l l of the t e rms of 
any a g r e e m e n t which e x i s t e d b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s and does n o t 
p r e c l u d e t h i s Court from hear ing a l l of the ev idence between t h e 
p a r t i e s as t o what t he a c t u a l a r rangement was between the v a r i o u s 
d e f e n d a n t s as t o t h e buy ing of t h e p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d t h e r e o n 
and the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the b u i l d i n g r e f e r r e d t o t he reon . 
3. The ev idence shows t h a t a l l of t he de fendan t s were 
engaged in a j o i n t v e n t u r e w i t h t h e i n t e n t of p u r c h a s i n g t h e r e a l 
p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d in the Earnes t Money Agreement , c o n s t r u c t i n g 
a b u i l d i n g t h e r e o n for t h e use and b e n e f i t of t h e d e f e n d a n t s , 
P r o c e s s In s t rumen t & C o n t r o l , Inc . and John A- H a l l , from which 
t r a n s a c t i o n the d e f e n d a n t s , Commerce P r o p e r t i e s , Inc . and Richard 
C. B e n n i o n , were t o r e c e i v e t en p e r c e n t (10%) of t h e t o t a l c o s t 
of sa id v e n t u r e . 
4. F u r t h e r , a l l four (4) of t h e d e f e n d a n t s v e r s 
encaged in the p r e l i m i n a r y planning of the b u i l d i n g to be b u i l t 
upon the real property, the taking of bids for said project and 
the application of a loan to fund said project from which all 
defendants intended to benefit. 
5. While so engaged, the defendant, Richard Bennion, 
as a co-venturor, requested that the plaintiff herein furnish to 
the joint venture architectural services in rendering 
preliminary drawings and final plans for the construction of the 
proposed building, 
6. Pursuant to the aforesaid request of the 
defendants, the plaintiff did in fact perform said architectural 
services, and the Court finds that the agreed upon and reasonable 
value of said architectural services was the sum of $13,000.00. 
7. The plaintiff is entitled to interest upon said sum 
at the rate of 10% per annum from and after April 4, 1985 to the 
dace of judgment, which is the sum of $3,537.84. 
8. As to the respective crossclaims of the defendants, 
the Court finds that an Earnest Money Contract, Exhibit 11, was 
signed between the defendants, Richard Bennion and John Hall. 
However, said contract was made subject to the approval of 
financing for said project by the Small Business Administration 
within 60 days from the signing thereof and it is clear from the 
evidence that said financing was not accomplished within the 60 
day period or in fact ever accomplished, thus, there was no cause 
of action upon this contract- Further, the Court finds that the 
oral arrangement existing between the defendants, Process 
Instruments & Controls and John Hall and Commerce Properties and 
Richard Bennion, that no fees were to be paid to Mr. Bennion or 
Commerce Properties unless the project was funded, thus there is 
no cause of action upon the crossclaim of Commerce Properties and 
Richard Bennion as against Hall. 
9. As to the crossclaim by Hall and PIC against 
Bennion and Commerce, the Court having previously found that all 
of these parties were engaged in a joint venture with each other, 
and were jointly and severally liable for the services rendered 
by plaintiff, the Court finds no cause of action upon said 
crossclaim, because no payment has been made by Hall of the 
amount owed to plaintiff. 
10. From the aforesaid Findings of Fact, the Court 
further makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendants, as joint venturors are jointly and 
severally liable to the plaintiff in the sum of $13,000.00, plus 
interest at the rate of 10% per annum from and after April 4, 
1985 until the date of judgment in the sum of $3,537.34, with 
each such defendant being liable, as between themselves for 50% 
of said judgment. 
2. In the event that either of said defendants pay any 
sum in excess of 50% of the aforesaid judgment, then th-t 
1 
de fendan t s h a l l have and be e n t i t l e d t o a judgment over a g a i n s t 
t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t such paymen t e x c e e d s 50% 
of the judgment . -
DATED t h i s ^ J ; _ i day of December, 1987 . 
BY THE COURT: 
^ D ^ E T S C ^ T T DANIELS 
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